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10 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Survey of Personnel Security

1. In accordance with your instruction of 27 September 1963, I have had a survey made of the status of personnel security within CIA. The report of my findings is attached at Tab A. The report is summarized in the paragraphs that follow, and recommendations appear in paragraph 15.

Purpose of the Survey

2. The purpose of the survey was to determine whether CIA regulations and procedures for maintaining personnel security (a) are adequate; (b) are known, understood, and followed; and (c) are effective.

Scope of the Survey

3. We interviewed the Director of Security and certain of his senior officers, the Director of Personnel, the Chief of the Medical Staff; the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, and a cross-section of office heads within the DD/I, DD/S, DD/P, and DD/S&T. We asked office heads to identify to us strong and weak supervisors, without specifying which was which. We interviewed in excess of 40 supervisors representing a wide range of grades and of responsibilities.

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We asked the Director of Personnel, the Chief of the Medical Staff, and supervisors to identify to us personnel who had married, traveled abroad, taken external training, written for publication, taken extended leave, or had any sort of personal experience that required the attention of the Office of Security. We then reviewed the security files of these individuals--some 40 in all. We also inquired at some length into the polygraph program, the security reinvestigation program, the security research program, and into the activities of the Personnel Security Division in general. Members of my staff now inspecting CIA installations in the Far East have been instructed to take particular note of personnel security and to report their findings to the Chief of Station. Preliminary reports from stations inspected to date have been generally favorable. The details of findings will be available upon the return of the inspectors to Headquarters.

Summary of Findings

4. The results of our investigation support the conclusion that the quality of personnel security in CIA is excellent. This does not rule out the possibility of a defection from our ranks to the opposition. Those interviewed were virtually unanimous in agreeing that no system of security controls can be devised that would detect, with certainty

SECRET

SECRET

and in advance, the sudden decision to defect. Experience has demonstrated, however, that the poor security risk becomes so through the cumulative effect of a combination of personal and official circumstances and that these circumstances are discernible.

5. The primary safeguard against the poor security risk is pre-employment screening. This involves a thorough check of qualifications, suitability, and security acceptability. The job is done conscientiously, and I am convinced that we have an effective program for identifying and disqualifying the individual with potential security vulnerabilities. The fact that subsequent security reinvestigations on a fairly large scale have discovered almost no "bad apples" is a good measure of the effectiveness of pre-employment procedures. Of particular significance in this regard is the fact that the Office of Security over the years has resisted pressures to accept for employment individuals on whom the initial security investigation had not been completed.

6. Once the individual passes the major barrier of the initial security investigation and is employed, he is thereafter subjected to a series of lesser hurdles that permit repeated reviews of the status of his security. For example, he must report marriage, private foreign travel, private external training, the joining of clubs or organizations, writing for publication, part-time employment, etc. Each of

SECRET

SECRET

these acts requires the approval of the Office of Security and each involves a review of his accumulated security file. At Tab C is a list of actions that require security approval. The review of files, selected by ourselves rather than the Office of Security, revealed no instance of non-compliance with these requirements.

7. The Security reinvestigation program that has been under way for over two years is a sound innovation. It supplements the reinvestigations that result from reviews of accumulated security files, from major changes in assignment, or from a change in the employee's clearance status (e.g., AEC, SI, TKH). The program is going slowly because of the press of current work. The program is pursued during slack periods and set aside during heavy workload periods. The near-zero rate of unfavorable findings suggests that the reinvestigation program can safely be pursued at its present level.

8. The work of the Security Research Staff is particularly noteworthy. It concerns itself with problems having possible counter-intelligence implications. It can and does take the time to inquire in depth, to review, and to analyze. It provides an additional check on the effectiveness of routine personnel security measures.

9. The Agency's polygraph program is one of our major security strengths. The degree to which it is accepted by Agency employees stems largely from the care with which the program is administered. It was initiated only after a careful R&D effort and lengthy experimentation

SECRET

SECRET

with volunteers; it is used as an aid to investigation and with discrimination; the polygraph records are maintained separately within the Office of Security. A memorandum prepared by the Director of Security regarding the polygraph program appears at Tab B.

10. Much of the effectiveness of the Agency's security program stems from the fact that it is centrally controlled and administered by the Office of Security. The Office is staffed with professionals who have made a career of security. The decisions that must be made in cases where security is the paramount issue are made by those who are best qualified by training and experience to make them. As a corollary, the inviolability of security files is a strong plus. The employee who comes into possession of information with security implications can pass it on to the Office of Security knowing that it will be tightly held and appropriately used.

11. We seriously doubt that high security standards result solely from regulations or procedures administered by the Office of Security. Good personnel security results from the cooperation of all concerned. We were particularly impressed with the extent of coordination, often informal and not covered by regulations, that exists among the Office of Security, the Office of Personnel, and the Medical Staff. There are, of course, problem cases that are almost solely the concern of Security. Often, however, the problems are of

SECRET

SECRET

concern to all three and solutions are found through the ad hoc committee approach.

12. As is apparent from the above, we found much to commend in the personnel security program as it is administered by professionals who devote their full time to it. We found much less consistency at the level of the supervisor who concerns himself with the security of his employees only "in addition to his other duties." In general, we found that the strong supervisor took serious account of personnel security; the weak supervisor did not. Supervisory weaknesses as regards personnel security are most pronounced among supervisors of relatively low GS grade. In my opinion, there is need for a program of indoctrination and reindoctrination of supervisors in their responsibilities as supervisors, including their responsibility in personnel security matters, and I have so recommended in paragraph 15.

13. We found other relatively minor weaknesses in the personnel security picture--some of which can be improved upon, some of which have no easy solution. For those to which we do see possible solutions, recommendations appear in paragraph 15.

a. The first barrier to penetration is the concealment of the identities of our personnel. There has been a progressive erosion of security in this regard.

SECRET

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

SECRET

TAB A

PERSONNEL SECURITY IN CIA

Report of Investigation

by

The Inspector General

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INTRODUCTION

1. The fact that emerges most clearly from this survey is that personnel security cannot be dealt with as an entity unto itself. We seriously doubt that high security standards can be attained solely through the deterrent effect of regulations or procedures administered by the Office of Security and by management. Good personnel security results in part from the cooperation of all concerned. Personnel security, employee morale, and the Agency image are inseparably bound together. The individual with good morale, engendered by respect for his Agency, will do his best to protect the public image of the Agency. This admittedly is an intangible factor, but we firmly believe that it is central among the many factors that combine to yield a good security posture in an organization.

2. It is axiomatic that the requirements of security must be balanced against the reasonable requirements of management. Total security would impose impossible limitations on the efficiency of the organization. As one security officer pointed out, total security would make it impossible to hire employees, to allow them to engage in operations, to publish the results of their activities or to permit them to resign once employed. We do not and could not aspire to total security. Our open society has an inherent resistance

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to police-state measures. The existence of narrow and rigid security restrictions would not only have an undesirably inhibiting effect on many employees but would make it impossible for us to hire persons having the qualities we seek. To meet these complex problems, the Office of Security has developed a philosophy that seeks to engender a sense of security responsibility in our employees, in whom considerable trust is then placed. This principle is perhaps easier to enunciate than it is to describe, but we believe that the evidence set forth in later paragraphs makes it clear that this philosophy does exist and that it is effective.

CIA SECURITY REGULATIONS

3. Attached at Tab C is an outline of the Agency's personnel security program, listing the specific regulations that apply to each aspect of the program. It is clear that the regulations are comprehensive. They have been kept current. The regulation on employee conduct for example, which covers such subjects as on- and off-the-job conduct, political activity, conflicts of interest, foreign awards and gifts, and marriage of employees, is now in the process of being rewritten.

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4. The substance of the regulations is important. The restrictions imposed upon the employee and the requirement that he report certain acts do have a deterrent effect. We believe,

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however, that the philosophy behind the regulations is of even more importance than their substance.

a. The regulations concentrate on the "soft" spots in the employee's career from the standpoint of security--those changes in his official or private life that may directly or indirectly affect his security status.

b. The regulations are a means whereby the Agency keeps itself informed of these changes in an employee's status. They provide a means of automatically ensuring that repeated reviews are made of an employee's security status throughout his career in the Agency. See paragraph 22 for a fuller treatment of this topic.

c. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the regulations protect the individual from inadvertently making himself vulnerable to the opposition. Security review of a proposed action enables the Office of Security to warn the employee of the possible hazard to his personal security that might result.

PRE-EMPLOYMENT PROCEDURES

5. In its search for new employees, the Agency resorts to a complex of mechanisms designed to ensure that we get personnel of the highest possible quality. The first, or at least one of the

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SECRET

earliest, concerns is with the individual's qualifications--whether he is or is not equipped to do the job to which he might be assigned. If he lacks the qualifications sought, there is, of course, no further interest in him. If he does appear to have the necessary qualifications, then we must discover whether he would be a suitable employee and whether he would be an acceptable security risk. Actually, little distinction can be made between suitability and security acceptability. There are applicants that are rejected solely on security grounds. More often, however, the weaknesses or vulnerabilities that might make an individual an unsuitable employee also disqualify him as an ^{un}acceptable security risk.

6. The first assessment of the potential employee is made by the recruiter. Once a candidate has been accepted as an applicant for employment, the Office of Security assumes responsibility for security clearance.


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ON-DUTY PROCEDURES

12. We are convinced that the security climate of the Agency,
so different from the individual's experience in civilian life, exercises

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SECRET

a positive influence on the attitudes and conduct of the new employee. The complex of physical security measures, to which the employee must conform, quickly becomes a part of his official life and induce in him a security consciousness that carries over into his private life. One of those whom we interviewed made the point that CIA employees have good security reflexes. He was thinking in terms of the fact that many of our people are working directly against the opposition and that all of us are fully aware that we are prime targets of the opposition. We believe that these favorable security reflexes stem in at least equal measure from the fact that dozens of times each day each employee is reminded of our security measures--the badge that is habitually worn, the guards, the safes, the room checks, the secure telephones, the burn trash bag, and so on. A previous statement is worth repeating: the employee is never allowed to forget that CIA takes security seriously.

The Responsibility of the Individual

13. Each employee, whether at Headquarters or in the Field, is held responsible for conducting himself in an acceptable manner. Standards of conduct are prescribed in Handbook A related regulation requires that each employee read the personal conduct handbook semi-annually and certify that he has read it. We conclude that there is an acceptable degree of compliance with the requirement that the handbook be circulated to all employees

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SECRET

every six months. We suspect, however, that this has become a pro forma exercise in which the average employee certifies that he has read the handbook when in actual fact he is merely noting that it has passed through his hands again. Even though there probably is a high percentage of non-compliance with the requirement that the handbook be read, we think it of value to continue to circulate it. The mere act of semi-annually calling to each employee's attention the fact that we have a regulation on personal conduct has a positive effect.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

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18. Although security is not specifically mentioned in the handbook on supervisory responsibilities, we doubt that this is a serious flaw. The handbook does make clear that the supervisor is expected to know his people.

19. In our conversations with selected heads of offices, in each Directorate, we asked them to identify strong and weak supervisors in a variety of grades, without specifying which they considered to be strong and which to be weak. We then interviewed

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these supervisors to discover whether they were familiar with security regulations, whether they understood them, and whether they thought the regulations to be effective. It might be noted that we had little difficulty in quickly discovering which were the strong supervisors and which were the weak. In general, we found that the strong supervisors did know and understand the regulations and required compliance with them. We also found that they knew the weaknesses and the strengths of the employees they supervised. Among the weaker supervisors, we found a generally lesser awareness of security requirements and a much less complete knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of those they supervised. The most significant deficiencies in supervision, particularly as regards the extent to which the supervisor knew and understood Agency regulations, appeared among supervisors in the lower GS grades.

20. Although weak supervision inevitably is a weakness in the Agency's security pattern, we believe that there are built-in safeguards that limit the damage that weak supervision can do. The supervisor-employee relationship does not operate in a vacuum. The weak supervisor in the lower grades is in turn supervised by various layers of supervisors of more experience and competence. Further, in most components there are support personnel who concentrate solely on the mechanics of administration and of management. They take up much of the slack caused by poor supervision.

SECRET

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Next 10 Page(s) In Document Denied

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31. Some years ago the Office of Security delivered to all Headquarters employees a security reindoctrination lecture. Although the lecture was, in effect, a rebriefing on security, it was so cleverly devised and so well presented that it was not looked upon by the

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SECRET

average employee as merely another "security lecture." A new reindoctrination program is now being put together and the presentations will begin in mid-November.

32. Although the Office of Security is primarily concerned with security, per se, its normal day-to-day duties far exceed its written charter. We reviewed the weekly reports of the Personnel Security Division covering the four-year period from January 1959 through December 1962. Based on our own past contacts with the Office of Security, we were aware that Security is often called upon to provide assistance to employees outside of the pure security field. We were amazed, however, at the extent of the assistance that Security renders to Agency employees. The range is virtually limitless and covers such things as assistance in case of accident, medical emergency, troubles with the police, housing, divorce, crank telephone calls, etc.

33. It might be argued that such personal assistance often does not involve matters having security implications and that other elements of the Agency should be assigned such responsibilities. We are convinced, however, that Security's close involvement with the welfare of Agency employees is appropriate and that there is a direct security benefit. The Agency has a reputation for "protecting its own" and it is clear that much of this reputation derives from the

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positive acts of the Office of Security. By extension, the Agency's reputation becomes, in large measure, the reputation of the Office of Security. The Office is respected by most employees and it is through its good reputation that it is able to accomplish its tasks as effectively as it does.

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